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1959] RECENT BooKS UH 
COMPARATIVE LAw: CAsES-TEXT-MATERIALS (Second Edition). By 
Rudolf B. Schlesinger. Brooklyn: The Foundation Press. 1959. Pp. xliv, 
635. $11. 
The communication soliciting this review suggested that "it would be 
most useful to have the book reviewed by one who does not belong to the 
small clique of professional comparatists, and who might have a fresh 
point of view." If to some it seems sacrilege for one with no standing in the 
select circle to pass judgment, let it be remembered that volenti non fit 
injuria. 
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The professional comparatist reviewing this book will have much to 
say about its suitability as a teaching tool. This I cannot do, though I 
have no reason to doubt its superior quality for that purpose. At least it 
is an immensely readable, well organized, and informative book, with well-
selected cases and well-written text. It is full of provocative questions, and 
is completed by a magnificent collection of bibliographical information, 
both in the footnotes and in a hundred-page classified bibliography. How-
ever it may serve for teaching purposes, it should prove an excellent guide 
for self-education in the field, at least within the channels laid down by 
the main objective of the author. I have only one criticism of the book, 
considered within its own frame of reference. The dialogue among Com-
parovich, Smooth, and Edge (pp. 201ft) seemed to me a cumbersome way 
to convey information, as compared with a systematic and straightforward 
exposition. But this may be only a personal idiosyncrasy in one who shame-
facedly confesses that he finds artificial and contrived even the dialogues 
of the first master of the genre. 
Any contribution I can make must lie in another direction-in the e~-
pression of an outsider's reaction to the conception of the comparative 
law course that is implicit in this book. Professor Schlesinger has effectively 
and succinctly characterized the main thrust of his work by saying that its 
primary objective is "to convey to the student 'that modicum of understand-
ing' and of familiarity with concept and terminology which will make it 
possible for him 'really to grasp an opinion of local counsel', and I might 
add, to write an understandable letter asking for such opinion." (p. xvi) 
Though in the present edition, by contrast to the first, the author recognizes 
that there may be other objectives, and makes a conscious effort to enrich 
the materials so that they can be implemented, still his original objective 
has cut the channel within which this set of materials runs. This is a 
"practical" book, designed to teach American students how to deal with 
foreign problems in the context of day-to-day law practice. This orienta-
tion is emphasized by the book's concentration on (and indeed its limita-
tion to) those legal systeiµs with which we have "the most significant human 
and commercial contacts." (p. xvii) The book offers a program of instruc-
tion in the legal problems of dealing across international boundaries, with 
detailed treatment of some domestic law topics that might be taken up in 
Conflict of Laws or in Procedure (but are not).1 It provides training in 
"bread and butter" law to pragmatic American law students who must 
be "sold" on any course that is not on the bar examination. Selling the 
students is constantly in the author's mind. Thus, in introducing the illus-
trative substantive law problems that he uses for detailed comparisons, he 
says: "Agency, Corporations and Conflict of Laws ... are of particular im-
. portance to the international practitioner serving American and foreign 
1 Thus pleading and proof of foreign law occupies over a hundred pages out of fewer 
than five hundred. 
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businessmen. The subject of Conflict of Laws necessarily impinges 
upon every transaction across international boundaries; and the appoint-
ment of agents as well as the choice of a form of business organization is a 
threshold problem unavoidably facing every lawyer whose clients engage 
in foreign business. No apology is needed, therefore, for the choice of these 
illustrative subjects." (pp. 392-393, italics added) No apology is needed, 
indeed, for a practical course, taught in a professional school, designed 
to teach practitioners to serve their clients and make money. But justified 
in practical terms, the course should stand or fall by the tests of the aca-
demic marketplace. If its justification rests on no higher ground, its vo-
taries should dispense with the aid of the "mystique" that helps sell the 
course to faculties, if not to students. However, when Professor Schle-
singer makes his case for the practicality of comparative law, saying that 
"it has become an everyday chore for members of the legal profession in 
this country to exchange views and information with lawyers in Paris, 
Zurich or Montevideo," (p. xv) he is speaking with the bias of a New 
York City lawyer-even a particular kind of New York City lawyer. Most 
lawyers in Denver and Bismarck and Amarillo, not to speak of Chicago 
or Detroit, even in mid-twentieth century, would spend a long professional 
lifetime in the law with no professional need, ever, to be aware of the very 
existence of Paris, Zurich, or Montevideo. If comparative law must stand or 
fall, in this country, by the tests of the marketplace, it will probably be a 
senior elective course, or even seminar, in the national law schools, and in 
some of the other schools training men for big city practice in the North-
east or on the Gulf Coast. This is the more true now that a lawyer may 
place on his bookshelf, for $11.00, a book that will quickly provide him 
with the beginnings of insight into the problems of international practice, 
in case of need. Better that he should take another course or seminar in 
tax, or security transactions, which will provide him a much more de-
pendable source of revenue! It will be long before the proliferation of 
our international contacts gives to comparative law the practical significance 
of many of the more lightly elected senior courses. The overwhelming 
success of the author's course at Cornell is less a tribute to the "practicality" 
of the course than to the skill of a teacher reputed to be one of the best in 
the business. Not every school can do so well for its comparative law 
program. 
If comparative law deserves to be encouraged beyond the pragmatic 
demands of students, the justification must rest on higher grounds-on 
those grounds that justify the inclusion in the curriculum of legal philos-
ophy, law and society, legal history, and other "perspective" or "jurispru-
dential" courses. It must rest on the broader insights that comparative law 
may provide, even for the lawyer who may never have an international 
case in his whole career. It must rest on the hope that the law can become 
a "learned" profession, and on that different sense of "practicality" that 
finds most utility in sound theory to prepare for the solution of tomor-
154 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [ Vol. 58 
ro~•s questions, rather than in "practical" discussion of those that were 
solved yesterday. It must rest on notions like that of Mr. Justice Holmes, 
who said that theory was "not to be feared as unpractical, for, to the 
competent, it simply means going to the bottom of the subject,"2 or of 
Mr. Justice Story, who said: "Many of our most illustrious statesmen 
have been lawyers; but they have been lawyers liberalized by philosophy, 
and a large intercourse with the wisdom of ancient and modern times."3 
It must rest on that more adequate appreciation of what is practical which 
would list as the most valuable mental asset of that eminently practical 
man, the engineer, the calculus, which is in essence nothing but a tau-
tological and abstract system of logic, utterly devoid of content -related 
to the real world, but a most powerful tool, nonetheless. Though Professor 
Schlesinger would surely be quick to utge that comparative law provides 
the broader insights that make it "practical" in this enlarged sense, he 
seems content to rest his case on the less adequate ground.4 This is un-
fortunate only because it tends to confine the materials within a narrower 
channel than would be the case if the objectives were less "practical." 
Professor Yntema's position provides an interesting and sharp contrast. 
He persuasively and repeatedly preaches that the whole of legal education 
must be reoriented on the basis of comparative legal science.5 In his view, 
indeed, comparison of laws is the nearest equivalent for our subject to that 
controlled experimental observation of phenomena that constitutes natural 
science. "The function of legal science," he says, "is . . . to establish the 
criteria of justice, principally through comparative research .... "6 Just 
how one can be sure he has found the true criteria of justice by a com-
parison of laws, whether they are alike or different, Yntema has not made 
entirely clear. The most exhaustive comparison of technical laws, even if 
it includes not only common and civil law but all other civilized legal 
systems and many primitive systems, may permit significant generalizations 
about positive law, but can tell us little about "justice," if "justice" is 
not the same as positive law. The criteria of "justice" come from outside 
the legal system-the system is not closed but is judged in terms of standards 
it does not create but which are given to it, whether by the will of Deity, 
or the nature of man, or the wishes of the articulate classes of a particular 
society. The criteria of justice must be sought, not in a comparison of 
technical rules of law, but in a wide range of social science and humanistic 
studies, or in another view, in theology. If Yntema were urging that a com-
2 Holmes, "The Path of the Law," 10 HARv. L. REv. 457 at 477 (1897). 
3 STORY, A DISCOURSE PRONOUNCED UPON THE INAUGURATION OF THE AUTHOR, AS DANE 
PROFESSOR OF LAW IN HARVARD UNIVERSITY, AUGUST 25, 1829, at p. 34. 
4 See Schlesinger, "Teaching Comparative Law: The Reaction of the Customer," 3 
AM. J. COMP. L. 492 (1954) for a full statement of the author's point of view. 
5 See especially Yntema, "Comparative Legal Research: Some Remarks on 'Looking 
out of the Cave'," 54 MICH. L. REV. 899 (1956). 
6 Yntema, "Comparative Legal Studies and the Mission of the American Law School," 
17 LA. L. REv. 538 at 545 (1957). 
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parison of technical law should be the basis for a reconstruction of the 
curriculum, his position would be untenable. However, his repeated in-
sistence upon the importance to the lawyer of the whole range of human-
istic studies suggests that he is really urging that a complete understanding 
of law must be sought in a study of the interrelationships of law and society 
in numerous geographical and temporal contexts. Yntema has urged that 
American legal education went wrong long ago by its emphasis on pro-
fessionalism, and that the use of "practical" criteria to test inclusion in the 
curriculum took the law out of the main stream of our cultural life. This 
also led to a stultifying concentration of academic lawyers on the "spurious" 
type of research that merely "briefs" or "digests" the existing state of the 
law in articles, casebooks, and textbooks.7 What is needed, he feels, is for 
legal education to get into the main stream of the university tradition, and 
to concern itself with a scientific search for truth. 
One need not agree with Yntema completely to find much of merit in 
his position. Certainly legal education needs to be humanized and liberal-
ized. Certainly we should give up the illusion that three years can pro-
vide all the necessary practical knowledge and skills for a lifetime of prac-
tice, and, by giving up the unreal goal, free at least some time to restore 
to legal education its concern for the larger questions. Certainly we should 
try to train legal statesmen instead of legal mechanics, even skillful ones-
to make of the law a truly "learned" profession. 
The curricular implications of this point of view are complex. For 
present purposes, it means, at least, that comparative law should have 
larger place in the curriculum, but not for narrowly practical reasons. 
It should not stand alone, for a mere comparison of technical rules of law 
has little beyond suggestive value unless it is enriched by a study of the 
relationship of the laws to the varying social contexts in which they de-
veloped. This kind of comparative law has a real contribution to make to 
legal education and to the advancement of legal science, which is equally the 
function of the university law school. With the other "perspective" courses, 
it is an indispensable part of any truly adequate legal education, which aims 
to make great lawyers and not merely successful lawyers. The law teacher, 
especially, needs the enlightenment that comparative studies of this 
broader kind can provide, to give him an additional perspective on his 
special subjects and a new integrating viewpoint for understanding the law 
as a whole. 
This point of view leads to doubts about Schlesinger's book. Viewed 
within its own frame of reference, the book is excellent. But perhaps the 
frame of reference is unduly constricted and the resultant course narrower 
than it should be. Perhaps even better would be a systematic introduction 
to a single advanced legal system, in enough detail and completeness to 
serve as a basis for later specific comparison of laws. Much might be said, 
7 Note 5 supra, at 902. 
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too, in favor of the inclusion in regular law school subjects of the insights 
that comparison of laws can provide. 
Schlesinger deals elsewhereS with the problem of student motivation, 
and makes this a principal justification for a practically oriented course. This 
is no Machiavellian device to dragoon the re9Uits, and law students are 
probably too smart to be fooled for long if it were. There is no facile 
answer to the problems created by the "practical" instincts of American 
law students. It may be, however, that the problem is less student motiva-
tion than faculty conviction, and that if faculty were fully convinced of the 
importance of the comparative and jurisprudential insights, students would 
accept the judgment. My experience leads me to more pessimism about the 
interest of teachers than of students. Thus, if a school is about to increase 
its jurisprudential offerings from one course to two, it is likely that some one 
will express concern lest some student take both of them. Would such a 
question be asked about a second tax course? 
If faculty attitudes are the key to the matter, it remains to inquire 
how faculty members can be convinced. If there is justification for my 
skepticism about the bread and butter significance of comparative law, 
outside the centers of international trade, then most faculties are not likely 
to respond to arguments based on practicality. In such case, the course 
could be "sold" only to faculties, and through them to students, on the 
broader ground. This makes it important to decide on what basis to con-
struct and to sell the comparative law course. 
s Note 4 supra, at 495. 
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